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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

22 September 1954

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chief, SR/DOB

**SUBJECT:** Proposed ARCHAMP Operation (Fall 1954/Spring 1955)  
and Agent Candidates for Such

1. On 29 July 1954 SR/COP approved a general and tentative operational plan for an ARCHAMP operation for fall 1954/spring 1955. This operation envisaged the use of two agents, one of whom, RASTENIS, had already been spotted, interviewed and assessed. As you are aware, CFI had since then requested that someone on the SR Division Chief or SR/COP level reinterview this prospective agent.

2. On 8 September 1954 SR/COP personally interviewed RASTENIS, and in general found this prospective agent suitable, providing that he not be used in a REDBOX operation as a singleton but that he rather be accompanied on such an operation by a mature individual of strong character, a person on whom he can lean for guidance and who will exercise a brotherly type of leadership. It is not necessary to have such an individual pose as the military type of leader over RASTENIS. This recommendation has been transmitted to CFI with the request that he grant the necessary exception and that clearance action by Staff C be initiated. It is not anticipated that clearance will be obtained prior to 15 November 1954.

3. In view of the foregoing, the need for one additional agent of strong character, stable personality and mature reasoning is paramount for the implementation of an ARCHAMP operation to be dispatched in the spring of 1955. Your efforts to produce such an individual will be greatly appreciated. In order to mount an operation in the spring of 1955, such an individual should be ready to begin training on 3 January 1955. This Branch, through its normal contacts with the Lithuanian community, will continue to spot for such an individual and furnish any leads to your Base.

4. Basically speaking, these agents will be dispatched on a mission to attempt to recruit legally living residents whom they will train in reporting and to whom they will furnish S/W links and live letter drops for communication with us. It is expected that these agents will exfiltrate overland in the fall of 1955. Your attention is called to the fact that this is not an operation entailing extensive "black living" in the woods which requires intensive survival training, but that it is intended to conduct this operation as a normal clandestine mission in which the agents will need to be able to reside in cities, contact legally living residents and behave as normal everyday inhabitants of their native area.

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5. Although it is quite difficult under the present circumstances to develop a sound operational plan, including training requirements and the all important time table, the following is a general, tentative plan, as well as time table for this operation, based on the assumption that both agents will be ready to enter training on 3 January 1955.

a. Training will consist of two phases:

Phase I will cover the period 3 January 1955 to 20 April 1955 and will consist of trade craft, field craft, Soviet reality, technical subjects, and physical conditioning.

Phase II will cover the period 20 April 1955 to 15 May 1955 and will be utilized as a briefing review period for presentation of final additional fine points of briefing, packing and preparation for movement, movement to the area of dispatch, and awaiting favorable weather conditions for dispatch if needed. The date 15 May 1955 is a date picked at random and will possibly need to be revised when a first readiness for dispatch date is received from the Frankfurt Air Section.

Since the agents will not be available for training in time to permit W/T training, no such training will be given. Instead, a much greater emphasis must be placed upon S/W training. It is realized that basic S/W instruction is usually given in 16 hours and that from that point on, it is up to the individual agent to become proficient in S/W by continuous practice. Consequently, daily supervised S/W practice periods are paramount for the success of this operation. It is urged that everything possible be done to insure that the agents actually practice S/W during such scheduled periods rather than that such periods be used for other activities as has happened in the past. For the purpose of future analysis of traffic, it is requested that all agent practice messages be transmitted to the Branch periodically during their training.

- b. Beginning with 7 February 1955, a minimum of 5 hours per week should be set aside for briefing purposes. This amount should be increased to a minimum of 8 hours beginning 7 March 1954. The final full week of training, 11 to 17 April, should include a minimum of 15 hours briefing time.
- c. It is hoped that practical problems will be conducted as often as possible. Sixty-five per cent of such problems should be conducted during the night hours.

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- d. Two means of infiltration are open to us at the present time, i.e., balloon infiltration or infiltration by parachute. Although a determination as to precisely which of these two means will be used in this operation will have to be made at a later date by taking into consideration the reports on the present, initial balloon infiltration attempt, it may well be presumed that the operation will be conducted by a parachute dispatch because balloon launching facilities for Lithuania are not available at the present time. Consequently, it is requested that the agents be given parachute training as a part of their assessment shortly after entering the training unit.

6. The following utilization of staff personnel, having the below enumerated responsibilities, on this operation is envisaged:

- a. Overall case officer responsibilities will be exercised by the chief of the Lithuanian section of this Branch. Initially, [ ] will be assigned this responsibility; subsequent to his proposed departure on PCS in January or February 1955, this responsibility will be transferred to his successor, [ ]. So that we do not become involved in the undesirable practice of introducing to the agents a new senior personality every so often, [ ] will act as [ ] assistant during the latter's tenure as chief of the Lithuanian section and will actually accompany [ ] at most meetings with the agents.
- b. [ ] will continue in her present position as [ ] [ ] assistant and will devote most all of her time to the support of this operation, to include the collation of legend material, documentation, map coverage, etc.
- c. If the need arises, this Branch will assign another assistant to [ ], [ ] so as to insure that all needed support will be adequately prepared and will be ready on time.
- d. It is anticipated that SR/DOB will furnish one senior SR/DOB case officer who will be in charge of all training and who will fully participate in the planning of the operation as well as the briefing of the agents. Final and overall responsibility, however, for these latter two facets will rest with the SR/2 Lithuanian section chief. It is envisioned that this Branch will not interfere with the training of the agents and will only offer suggestions for changes when it is found that any portion of training conflicts with the overall operational plan and intent.

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- e. It will be SR/DOB's responsibility to determine whether one or two junior case officers will be needed on this project, and it is expected that such will be assigned by SR/DOB. The standard, accepted responsibilities and functions will apply to these junior case officers. They will be under the direct supervision and control of the SR/DOB senior case officer and will not receive orders or instructions from any member of SR/2 unless such orders and instructions are passed to them through the SR/DOB senior case officer.
- f. The determination for the need, as well as the assignment of indigenous instructors (covert associates), and the determination of how many such instructors will be needed, will be the responsibility of SR/DOB. Obviously, it would be preferable to have Lithuanian/English speaking instructors so that the SR/DOB case officers would not become involved in language difficulties; nevertheless, this Branch need not be consulted as to the desirability of having one or another instructor assigned. This Branch does, however, reserve the right to request a change of indigenous instructors should poor performance, inadequate handling of agents, etc., warrant such a change. Here again--as in the case of the junior case officers--no orders or instructions will be passed to the indigenous instructors by any member of SR/2 except through the SR/DOB senior case officer.
7. It is regretted that no firmer commitments and plans can be offered at this time; however, the situation is so tenuous at the present time that nothing more concrete can be supplied. An appropriate amendment to this plan will be transmitted when the situation has crystalized itself. It is hoped that, based on the above, a tentative training plan can be formulated. Upon receipt of this plan, this Branch is prepared to supply appropriate comments.

[ ]  
Acting Chief, SR/2

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PROPOSED AECHAMP SPRING OF 1955 OPERATION

1. Mission

To establish support points within Lithuania for future operations to that or other USSR areas, and to obtain positive and operational intelligence concerning the Lithuanian USSR.

2. Agents

It is contemplated that two agents will be dispatched. One agent has already been assessed with satisfactory results and is awaiting Chief, FI Exception approval. The second agent will be selected after assessment of several prospects is completed.

3. Timing

It is anticipated that training of one agent will begin about 1 October 1954, with the second entering training approximately 1 December 1954. Training and briefing will be completed by 1 May 1955. Dispatch will be during the month of May 1955. A tentative requirement for air dispatch will be levied upon the Air Support Section, upon approval of this plan.

4. Means of Infiltration

The following means of infiltration are the most probable (in order of their listing):

- a. By parachute
- b. Overland through the Murmansk area
- c. By balloon

The exact means is contingent upon the degree of success of other Baltic operations carried out before Spring 1955.

5. Operational Plan

If entry into Lithuania is through 4a or 4c above, agents will carry W/T equipment which will be immediately cached. Subsequent to this action (or immediately upon entrance into Lithuania if entry was through means described in paragraph 4b above), agents will approach selected contact points in Lithuania for housing. After secure accommodations have been procured, they will approach other contacts with the intent of recruiting them to act as resident agents. If the recruitment is successful, the new agents will be trained in S/W or W/T techniques, as well as in elementary tradecraft. After the training is completed, the resident agents will be placed in W/T or S/W contact with KUBARK, and the two infiltrated agents will attempt exfiltration.

6. Exfiltration

The agents will attempt to return to the West overland, either through the Karelian SSR area, or across the Lithuanian-Polish border, thence through Poland and East Germany. The means of exfiltration are contingent, respectively, upon:

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- a. SR/2's success with current operations across the Karelian SSR-Finnish or Karelian SSR-Norwegian border.
- b. A determination of the security of the [ ] contacts on the Lithuanian-Polish border and in Poland and success in our attempts to establish an exfiltration route across the Lithuanian-Polish border using leads obtained from a letter channel between the U.S. and Lithuania and Poland.

7. Contacts in Lithuania

It is envisaged that the contacts used by agents in Lithuania (both for safehouses and for recruitment and training) will come from the following two sources, unless more reliable leads are developed in the meantime:

- a. Contacts furnished by [ ]: [ ] has named some people in Lithuania who are promising not only because they appear to be willing to be involved in resistance/intelligence activities, but also because they occupy positions in the Soviet commercial system which enable them to furnish valuable assistance to our agents, as well as to have an unusual degree of freedom for movement themselves. There are two reservations concerning use of these [ ] contacts, however; First, the possibility of RIS control. Although it appears, through all the technical means at our disposal, that [ ] is not a witting Soviet agent, the RIS could, unknown to him, be aware of his escape from Lithuania and thus have his contacts under observation. Secondly, the time lag between [ ] escape from Lithuania--1952--and the date of the operational use of his contacts--1955--is long enough to make the contacts somewhat "stale." This may be partially overcome by having [ ] write letters (to be mailed in the USSR) to his contacts with the hope that they would reply and give some indication as to their current status.
- b. Existing Mail Channels: It is intended to develop one or two reliable contact points in Lithuania as a result of exploiting correspondence channels between the Lithuanian SSR and the U.S. Although this type of contact point will be the most current it will be very difficult to determine, before the agents' dispatch, the circumstances under which the Lithuanian correspondent lives and whether he is definitely trustworthy. ~~In any case, at least a one way channel (from the agent to the U.S.) could possibly be established.~~

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8. Training

The awkwardness of dual starting dates for training (see paragraph 3 above) is recognized. However, attempts will be made to insure that the time the first agent spends training alone will be utilized for subjects in which his aptitude is somewhat deficient, such as Russian language and W/T. The training program will consist of the usual tradecraft, Soviet reality, etc., subjects. W/T will be taught to at least the first agent. Both agents will receive very intensive training in S/W, including numerous practice letters under imagined operating conditions. In order to minimize the weight of the equipment with which the agents will enter the USSR, an attempt will be made to train them to get along without the various operational gadgets and gear that is normally available. Instead, the agents will be encouraged to plan on improvising and procuring within the USSR. The training program will be discussed with DOB as soon as this tentative plan is approved.

9. Support

- (1) Logistics. Operational material will be requisitioned from SR/LOG upon approval of this plan.
- (2) Operational Currency. The agents will carry a total of approximately 7-8 for this operation, and    will be cached for future use in Lithuania.
- (3) Documentation. Documentation requirements will be discussed with TSS upon approval of this tentative plan.

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